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THE 1970 BANK SECRECY ACT AND THE
RIGHT OF PRIVACY
The provisions of the Bank Secrecy Act1 requiring financial institu-
tions to maintain records and to submit reports of large currency trans-
actions were designed primarily as crime detection devices. A substantial
reason for enactment of the Act was the difficulty encountered in prose-
cuting tax and securities violations because of the impossibility of ob-
taining information about secret foreign bank accounts.2 Although such
legislation may be beneficial to the government, the recent federal court
decision in Stark v. Connally3 demonstrates that the requirements of the
Act may have an adverse impact on the rights of individuals. The court's
holding, that it is a violation of an individual's constitutional right of
privacy to require routine reports of an individual's financial transactions,
is likely to give rise to further litigation. Before considering the nature
of the constitutional right of privacy and its relationship to the provisions
of the Bank Secrecy Act, it is necessary to discuss the scheme of record-
keeping and reporting required by the Act.
REQUIREMENTS OF THE BANK SECREcY AcT
Record-keeping
The record-keeping requirements of the Act apply to insured banks,4
other insured financial institutions,5 some non-insured businesses,6 and, in
1. 12 U.S.C. § 1730(d), 1829b, 1951-59 (1970); 31 U.S.C. H9 1051-1122 (1970). The
Bank Secrecy Act was enacted in 1970, to be effective on May 1, 1971. The regulations
which issued pursuant to the Act on March 31, 1972 by their own terms were not
operative until July 1, 1972; therefore, the Act and the regulations were not challenged
until recently.
2. H.R. REP. No. 975, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), in US. Code Cong. & Admin. News,
4394-96 (1971). See Note, The "Secret" Swiss Account: End of an Era, 38 BROOKLYN
L. R.v. 384, 393-94 (1971).
Congress determined that the keeping and maintaining of adequate records by banks
and other financial institutions has "a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, and
regulatory investigations and proceedings." 12 U.S.C. § 1829b (a) (1) (1970).
3. 347 F. Supp. 1242 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
4. 12 U.S.C. § 1829b (a) (1) (1970).
5. Id. § 1730(d).
6. Id. § 1951(a). The types of businesses covered by this section are enumerated in
section 1953 (b), which provides:
I [ 929]
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certain circumstances, to individuals.7 The Secretary of the Treasury is
authorized to require the maintenance of various types of records, in-
cluding microfilm or other reproductions of checks kept by banks, as
well as records of the identity of persons maintaining accounts or those
authorized to act with respect to accounts."
In exercising his authority, the Secretary has issued extensive record-
keeping requirements for banks,9 together with less rigorous require-
ments for other financial institutions.10 Under these requirements, all
financial institutions must maintain records of credit extensions exceeding
$5,000, except those secured by an interest in real property.' Moreover,
most transactions resulting in, or intended to result in, a foreign transfer
of funds, currency, or other monetary instruments must be recorded.' 2
The authority of the Secretary under this section extends to any person
engaging in the business of carrying on any of the following functions:
(1) Issuing or redeeming checks, money orders, travelers' checks, or similar
instruments, except as an incident to the conduct of its own nonfinancial
business.
(2) Transferring funds or credits domestically or internationally.
(3) Operating a currency exchange or otherwise dealing in foreign cur-
rencies or credits.
(4) Operating a credit card system.
(5) Performing such similar, related, or substitute functions for any of the
foregoing or for banking as may be specified by the Secretary in regulations.
The Secretary has utilized his authority under section 1953(b), further, to define what
institutions are encompassed by the record-keeping requirements. See Treas. Reg.
§§ 103.11-.33 (1972).
7. 31 U.S.C. § 1121 (1970). Individuals are required to maintain records concerning
their relationships with foreign financial agencies. Since section 1121 applies both to
reports to be submitted and records to be maintained by individuals, its requirements
will be discussed with the reporting provisions of the Act. See notes 17-25 infra & ac-
companying text.
8. 12 U.S.C. § 1829b (a) (1) (1970).
9. Treas. Reg. §§ 103.33-34 (1972). The Secretary's definition of "bank" encompasses
not only insured banks but also other banks, credit unions, savings and loan associations,
and insured institutions as defined in section 401 of. the National Housing Act. Id.
§ 103.11 (a).
The Secretary's authority under the Act to issue regulations is contingent upon his
determination that the maintenance of such records will have a high degree of useful-
ness in criminal, tax, or regulatory investigations or proceedings. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1829b(b),
1953(a) (1970).
10. Treas. Reg. § 103.33(a). Since banks are considered financial institutions under
the Secretary's definition, Id. § 103.11(b), all provisions relating to "financial institu-
tions" apply to banks.
11. Id. § 103.33 (a).
12. Id. §§ 103.33(b), (c). Subsection (b) requires: "A record of each advice, request,
or instruction received regarding a transaction which results in the transfer of funds,
or of currency, other monetary instruments, checks, investment securities, or credit,
[Vol. 14:929
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In addition, banks are required to retain copies of various documents,
statements, and nearly all checks drawn on or issued by the bank.' 8
The Act empowers the Secretary to take measures to insure compli-
ance with the record-keeping requirements, including the assessment of
of more than $10,000 to a person, account, or place outside the United States." Subsection
(c) is substantially identical, except that it applies to requests given to another financial
institution or other person located within or without the United States, regarding a
transaction intended to result in the transfer of funds or various monetary instruments.
These record-keeping requirements are substantially less demanding than those ordinarily
proposed. See Proposed Treas. Regs. § 103.33, 36 Fed. Reg. 11209 (1971).
13. Treas. Reg. §§ 103.34(b) (1)-(10) (1972). In order to have a better understanding
of the extensive nature of the records required under this regulation, it is helpful to
view the pertinent provisions:
(b) Each bank shall, in addition, retain either the original or a microfilm
or other copy or reproduction of each of the following:
(1) Each document granting signature authority over each deposit or
share account;
(2) Each statement, ledger card or other record on each deposit or share
account, showing each transaction in, or with respect to, that account;
(3) Each check, clean draft, or money order drawn on the bank or issued
and payable by it, except those drawn on accounts which can be expected
to have drawn on them an average of at least 100 checks per month ...
which are (i) dividend checks, (ii) payroll checks, (iii) employee benefit
checks ....
(4) Each item other than bank charges or periodic charges made pursuant
to agreement with the customer, comprising a debit to a customer's deposit
or share account, not required to be kept, and not specifically exempted,
under subparagraph (3) of this paragraph;
(10) Records prepared or received by a bank in the ordinary course of
business, which would be needed to reconstruct a demand deposit account
and to trace a check deposited in such account through its domestic process-
ing system or to supply a description of a deposited check. This subpara-
graph shall be applicable only with respect to demand deposits.
Subparagraphs (5)-(9) of this section pertain to recording requirements of. transfers or
receipts of funds to and from foreign sources when such transfers or receipts involve
more than $10,000.
Banks are further required to retain records of the taxpayer identification numbers
of persons maintaining accounts; in the case of an account of one or more individuals,
a bank must maintain a record of the social security number of an individual having a
financial interest in that account. Id. § 103.34(a). This provision applies only to deposit
or share accounts opened with a bank after June 30, 1972, by persons residing in, or
doing business in the United States, or by citizens of the United States. With one ex-
ception, all records presently required by the Secretary must be retained for a period
of five years. Id. § 103.36(c). Records required to be kept under Treasury Regulation
103.34(b) (10) must be kept for two years. Id. § 103.36(c). However, the Act author-
izes the Secretary to require any records to be kept for six years, unless he determines
that a longer period is necessary. 12 U.S.C. § 1829b(g) (1970).
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civil penalties for willful violations. 14 Moreover, the Secretary may apply
for injunctions where "it appears .. .that any person has engaged, is
engaged, or is about to engage in any acts or practices constituting a
violation of any regulation under this chapter .... 15 Criminal sanctions
also may be imposed for willful violations.'6
Reporting
A. Foreign Transactions
The Act requires the submission of reports of the export or import of
monetary instruments, as well as reports of relationships with foreign
financial agencies." However, reports concerning the export or import
of monetary instruments are required only when the amount transmitted
exceeds $5,000.' Moreover, the requirements do not apply to common
carriers, 19 Federal Reserve banks, and, in some circumstances, other banks,
14. 12 U.S.C. S 1955 (1970). A strong argument can be made for the proposition that
this section applies only to businesses covered under 12 U.S.C. § 1951 and should not
extend to insured banks and other insured institutions under 12 U.S.C. §§ 1829b, 1730(d).
The language in section 1955 states that the penalties therein provided are applicable
only to violations under "this chapter." This language suggests that section 1955 should
not apply to the other two code provisions. However, the Secretary has taken a con-
trary position and issued regulations applying to "any domestic financial institution."
Thus, the regulations would cover insured banks and other insured institutions. See
Treas. Reg. § 103.47 (1972).
15. 12 U.S.C. § 1954 (1970). Since this section states that it applies to "this chapter,"
it can be argued that its provisions do not apply to insured banks and other insured
institutions. See note 14 supra.
16. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1956-57 (1970). Section 1957, entitled "Additional criminal penalty
in certain cases," is applicable only to violations of the record-keeping requirements
committed "in furtherance of the commission of any violation of Federal law punish-
able by imprisonment for more than one year . . . ." Since section 1957 expressly applies
to businesses covered under 12 U.S.C. §§ 1829b and 1730(d), as well as to those within
the provisions of 12 U.S.C. § 1951, it therefore applies to insured banks and other in-
sured institutions. Conversely, since section 1956 does not expressly apply to sections
1829b and 1730(d), it can be argued that violations by insured banks and other insured
institutions are not covered by this section. For a similar argument, see note 14 supra.
However, the Secretary's regulations apply to "any person," and do not exempt persons
working for insured banks or other insured institutions. Treas. Reg. § 103.49(a) (1972).
17. See 31 U.S.C. § 1121 (1970). Reports of the exportation or importation of mone-
tary instruments are required if the transportation of such instruments is "from any
place within the United States to or through any place outside the United States," Id.
§ 1101(a) (1) (A); if the transportation is "to any place within the United States from
or through any place outside the United States," Id. § 1101 (a) (1) (B); or finally, if any
person "receives monetary instruments at the termination of their transportation to the
United States from or through any place outside the United States." Id. § 1101 (a) (2).
18. Id. S 1101(a).
19. Id. S 1101(c). This section exempts common carriers both as to monetary instru-
[Vol. 14:929
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brokers, and individuals. 21 Similarly, the transfer of funds through nor-
mal banking procedures not involving the physical transportation of cur-
rency or monetary instruments need not be reported.2'
The section of the Act authorizing the Secretary to require reports
of relations with foreign financial agencies applies to residents and citi-
zens, as well as to other persons engaged in business in the United States.22
The Secretary is empowered further to require such information as the
identities and addresses of the parties to the transaction, the legal capaci-
ties in which the parties are acting, and a description of the transaction,
including the amount of money, credit, and property involved.21 This
section of the Act has been utilized only to the extent of requiring per-
sons "having a financial interest in, or signature or other authority over,
a bank, securities or other financial account in a foreign country" to re-
port such relationship on his federal income tax return.24
B. Domestic Currency Transactions
The scope of the Secretary's power to require reports relating to do-
mestic financial transactions is comprehensive. Such reports must be sub-
mitted "at such time, in such manner, and in such detail" as the Secretary
may require. 25 However, the transactions concerned must involve the
payment, receipt, or transfer of currency or other monetary instru-
ments.26
ments possessed by passengers and as to shipments of monetary instruments not declared
to be such by the shipper.
20. Treas. Reg. § 103.23 (c) (1972).
21. Id. § 103.23 (a).
22. 31 U.S.C. § 1121 (1970). This section also authorizes the Secretary to require
records of relationships with foreign financial agencies. However, it should be noted
that persons required to keep records under this section cannot be required to produce
or disclose the contents of such records except in compliance with a valid subpoena. Id.
§ 1121(b).
23. Id. § 1121 (a) (1)-(3).
24. Treas. Reg. § 103.24 (1972).
25. 31 U.S.C. § 1081 (1970).
26. Id. Once the Secretary has determined that reports are necessary, he may require
that they be submitted by both the financial institutions and the other parties involved.
Id. § 1082. If a participant to the transaction is not acting only for himself, the Secre-
tary may require the person on whose behalf the transaction was entered to be identi-
fied in the report. Id. He is also empowered to designate various domestic financial
institutions to receive and transmit the reports in such manner as he prescribes. Id.
§ 1083 (a). However, any person may, if he so desires, file the report directly with the
Secretary. Id. § 1083 (b) (2).
-19731
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The reports presently required by the Secretary, however, are sub-
stantially less extensive than those which are authorized under the Act.
Present Treasury regulations require that reports be made by financial
institutions only when a transaction in currency exceeds $10,000;27 fur-
thermore, many such transactions have been exempted.28 It should be
noted that present regulations do not provide for the reporting of domes-
tic financial transactions by individual citizens. 29
C. Enforcement of Domestic and Foreign Reporting Requirements
The authority to compel compliance with the domestic and foreign
reporting requirements corresponds to that which is granted with respect
to record-keeping."0 The Secretary may assess civil penalties3l and may
seek injunctions.82 Criminal penalties also are available.88 Provisions are
made for the immunity of witnesses in proceedings for violation of the
reporting requirements. 34 In addition, failure to file a required report of
a transaction involving monetary instruments subjects the instruments
involved to seizure. 5
The nature of the provisions of the Act and of the regulations issued
thereunder demonstrate an intent to further the interest of the govern-
ment in detecting illegal financial transactions. However, as is often the
case, measures designed in the interest of government may operate to
infringe upon the rights of individuals. It is thus necessary to determine
whether certain provisions of the Bank Secrecy Act violate individual
rights protected by the Constitution.
27. Treas. Reg. § 103.22(a) (1972).
28. Id. § 103.22(b). Transactions with Federal Reserve Banks, as well as transactions
originated by financial institutions or foreign banks are among those exempted from
the reporting requirements by this section.
29. See Treas. Reg. § 103.22 (1972).
30. Compare notes 14-16 supra & accompanying text with notes 31-32 infra & accom-
panying text. The Secretary has the responsibility of maintaining compliance with both
the reporting and record-keeping requirements. 12 U.S.C. S 1958 (1970); 31 U.S.C. §
1054 (1970). However, while the Secretary is explicitly authorized to issue regulations
to carry out the purposes of reporting, he is not given such authority in the area of
record-keeping. 31 U.S.C. § 1053 (1970); 12 U.S.C. H9 1951-59 (1970).
31. 31 U.S.C. § 1056 (1970). Civil penalties of amounts not exceeding $1,000 are author-
ized under this section.
32. Id. § 1057.
33. Id. H§ 1058-59.
34. Id. § 1060. The presiding officer of a court, grand jury, agency of the United
States or Congress may grant such immunity.
35. Id. § 1102. The Secretary has the power to remit any such forfeiture. Id. § 1104.
[Vol. 14:929
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CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE BANK SECRECY ACT
In Stark v. Connally36 a bank, its customers, and a bank association
sought to enjoin the Secretary of the Treasury from enforcing the Bank
Secrecy Act. The plaintiffs maintained that enforcement of the Act
would cause grave and irreparable injury to their constitutional rights.81
Without discussion, the court held that enforcement of the record-
keeping provisions was not violative of plaintiffs' constitutional rights.38
Furthermore, alluding to the broad powers of the executive in the area
of foreign affairs and having satisfied itself of the existence of adequate
procedural safeguards, the court upheld provisions of the Act requiring
the reporting of foreign financial transactions. 9
Reporting provisions relating to domestic financial transactions pre-
sented a more formidable problem. Concerned with the breadth of the
Secretary's power in this area4" and the fact that the government could
require the reports to be produced without subpoena or warrant, the
court held that these reporting provisions violated the right of privacy
protected by the Bill of Rights and, in particular, by the fourth amend-
ment guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures.-" In order to
assess the court's conclusions concerning the apparent conflict between
the right of privacy and the aims of the Bank Secrecy Act, it is n'ecessary
to consider the development of the constitutional right of privacy with
special emphasis on personal financial affairs.
Sources of the Right to Financial Privacy
The origins of a legal right of privacy may be found in 15th century
Anglo-Saxon law.42 However, the development of the right in this coun-
36. 347 F. Supp. 1242 (ND. Cal. 1972).
37. The plaintiffs argued that enforcement of the Act would invade "their right to
freedom from unreasonable search; their constitutional right of privacy; their privilege
against self-incrimination; their right to due process as it may affect banks and bank
customers, and also the right of private association protected by the First Amendment."
347 F. Supp. at 1244. It could also be argued that the provisions of the Act interfere
with the right of private contract. Cf. LeValley & Lancy, The IRS Summons and the
Duty of Confidentiality: A Hobsor's Choice for Bankers, 89 BANK I L.J. 979-89 (1972).
38. 347 F. Supp. at 1244. However, in discussing the reporting provisions of the Act,
the court noted some of the leading cases concerning record-keeping. Id. at 1250.
39. Id. at 1244-45.
40. The court noted the power of the Secretary to promulgate regulations to carry
out the purposes of the Act and to carve out exemptions from the Act's requirements.
Id. at 1246. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 1053, 1055 (1970).
41. 347 F. Supp. at 1246-51.
42. Pipe, Privacy: Establishing Restrictions on Government Inquiry, 18 AM. U. L.
Rav. 516, 521 (1969). The Supreme Court recognized the ancient nature of the right in
19731
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
try, at least such as to protect an individual from government interfer-
ence, was delayed until the last decade. 43 Because the right of privacy
is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, 44 it must be implied.45
The most elusive aspect of the concept of a right of privacy has been
the development of an exact definition.46 It appears, however, that the
most useful approach is to ascertain those areas in which a right of priva-
cy exists, rather than to engage in unnecessary definitional debates.4 7 Be-
fore determining whether there is a right of privacy in the area of finan-
cial affairs, it is necessary to note the provisions of the Constitution
from which a right of privacy may be derived.
Griswold v. Connecticut, stating: "We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill
of Rights-older than our political parties, older than our school system." 381 U.S. 479,
486 (1965). For a discussion of the historical development of the doctrine in this country
see O'Connor, The Right to Privacy in Historical Perspective, 53 MAss. L.Q. 101 (1968).
43. See Goldstein, The Constitutional Rights of Privacy-"A Sizable Hunk of Liberty,"
26 Mo. L. REv. 249, 250-51 (1966).
44. Roe v. Wade, 41 U.S.L.W. 4213, 4225 (U.S. Jan. 23, 1973); see Doe v. Bolton, 41
U.S.L.W. 4233, 4242 n.2 (U.S. Jan. 23, 1973) (Douglas, J., concurring); Goldstein, supra
note 43.
45. Comment, Financial Disclosure by Public Officials and Public Employees in Light
of Carmel-By-The-Sea v. Young, 18 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 534, 538 (1971); see Beaney, The
Constitutional Right to Privacy in the Supreme Court, 1962 SUP. CT. REv. 212, 214.
46. See Gross, The Concept of Privacy, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 34, 35 (1967). Commentators
have recognized that the right of privacy has been left largely undefined. A. WSrnN,
PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967); O'Connor, supra note 42. However, attempts to define
it have been numerous. In 1890, Warren and Brandeis identified privacy as the right
"to be let alone." Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 195
(1890). It should be noted that the early arguments for a right of. privacy were con-
cerned primarily with intrusions upon privacy by other individuals, in contrast to those
conducted by the government. However, the Warren and Brandeis definition of the
right was adopted and applied to government action by Justice Brandeis in his
dissent in Ohnstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928). As applied to govern-
ment action, this definition appears to be unnecessarily broad. As was recognized by
Justice Stewart in Katz v. United States: "Virtually every governmental action in-
terferes with personal privacy to some degree. The question in each case is whether
that interference violates a command of the United States Constitution." 389 U.S. 347,
350 n.5 (1967). Professor Westin has defined privacy as "[the claim of individuals,
groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent in-
formation about them is communicated to others." A WEsTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM
7 (1967). Another commentator has stated that lawyers and social scientists recognize
that "the basic attribute of an effective right of privacy is the individual's ability to
control the circulation of information relating to him . . . ." A. MILLER, THE AssAULT ON
PRIVACY 25 (1971). For a criticism of these definitions see Lusky, Invasion of Privacy:
A Clarification of Concepts, 72 CoLUM. L. REV. 693 (1972). Privacy has also been de-
fined as "the condition of human life in which acquaintance with a person or with
affairs of his life which are personal to him is limited." Gross, supra at 35-36.
47. This appears to be the approach taken by Justice Douglas in his concurring
opinion in Doe v. Bolton, 41 U.S.L.W. 4233, 4242-43 (U.S. Jan. 23, 1973).
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Three basic sources of the right of privacy exist with respect to fed-
eral action. The first source lies in those rights expressly protected by the
first eight amendments to the Constitution, particularly the fourth and
fifth. Moreover, certain "fundamental rights" other than those contained
in the first eight amendments may be utilized in deriving a right of pri-
vacy. Such rights arguably may be found within the provisions of the
ninth amendment. A third source of the right exists in the "penumbra"
of guarantees contained in the first nine amendments.
The Fourth Amendment As A Source of Financial Privacy
The most conspicuous area of the Constitution in which to seek a zone
of privacy regarding the Bank Secrecy Act is the unreasonable search
and seizure clause of the fourth amendment. 48 It can be argued, as il-
lustrated in Stark, that the enforcement of the broad recording require-
ments of the Act, without subpoena or warrant, is such an unreasonable
search as to constitute an invasion of privacy.49 However, the character-
ization of the reporting requirements of the Act as a search is question-
able. Since the only substantive proscription contained in the fourth
amendment is that against "unreasonable searches and seizures," the zone
of privacy as to this amendment only exists within the context of this
proscription.50 For this reason, unless a search or seizure is involved, it
is improper to imply a zone of personal privacy from the language of the
fourth amendment.51 An examination of the cases cited by Stark will
facilitate a determination of whether the reporting requirements of the
Act amount to a "search" within the meaning of the fourth amendment.
One of the principal cases upon which the court relied in Stark was
City of Carmel-By-The-Sea v. Young.52 In that case, a penal statute re-
quiring financial disclosures by public officials was challenged. The
California Supreme Court found the disclosure act to be an unconstitu-
tional invasion of the right of privacy, stating that "protection of one's
48. The fourth amendment was "designed to strike a balance between the interests
of the state in the effective administration of criminal justice and the interests of. the
individual citizens of the state in their right to be secure from unreasonable searches
and seizures." Note, The Constitutionality of the Use of Search Warrants to Obtain
Tax Records, 6 GA. L. REv. 399, 416 (1972). See generally Wood, The Scope of the
Constitutional Immunity Against Searches and Seizures, 34 Wr VA. L.Q. 1 (1927).
49. 347 F. Supp. 1242, 1246 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
50. Comment, Financial Disclosure by Public Officials and Public Employees in Light
of Carmel-By-The-Sea v. Young, 18 U.C.LA.L. Ray. 534, 541 (1971).
51. Id. See Beaney, supra note 45, at 250; Goldstein supra note 43, at 251.
52. 2 Cal. 3d 259, 466 P.2d 225, 85 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1970).
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personal financial affairs .. .against compulsory public disclosure is an
aspect of the zone of privacy which is protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment." 51 The cases upon which the California court relied, however,
were not clearly analogous. With one exception, these cases involved
physical searches, an element not present in the enforcement of disclosure
requirements. 4 This deficiency might have been ameliorated-and the
rationale for extending fourth amendment protections to financial dis-
closures strengthened-had the court attempted to extend the decision
of the Supreme Court in Katz v. United States.5
In Katz, the government attempted to use evidence which was ac-
quired, without a warrant, by electronic surveillance. The government's
activities were found to constitute a search and seizure within the fourth
amendment and thus violative of the petitioner's right of privacy. The
Court recognized that a search need not include a physical intrusion,
stating: "The Fourth Amendment protects people-and not simply
'areas'-against unreasonable searches and seizures, and... [the] Amend-
ment cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intru-
sion into any given enclosure." 56
53. Id. at 268, 466 P.2d at 231-32, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 7-8. The court also relied upon the
"penumbral rights" language of Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Id. at
266-67, 466 P.2d at 230-31, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 6-7. For a discussion of penumbral rights as
articulated in Griswold, see notes 97-106 infra & accompanying text.
The issues involved in Carmel can be distinguished from those raised by the Bank
Secrecy Act. The disclosures in Carmel were public, whereas disclosures under the Act
are only to the government. In addition, the Act can apply to financial institutions and
all individuals, rather than only to public officials. For discussion of Carmel see Note,
Constitutional Law-Privacy-A Constitutional Right of Privacy Protects Personal Finan-
cial Affairs of Public Officials from Overbroad Disclosure Requirements, 49 Tx. L. REv.
346 (1971); Note, Constitutional Law-Right of Privacy-Mandatory Financial Disclosure
Statements from Public Officials-Unwarranted Intrusion or Legitimate Public Concern,
45 TuL. L. Rav. 167 (1970); Comment, Financial Disclosure by Public Officials and
Public Employees in Light of Carmel-By-The-Sea v. Young, 18 U.C.L.AL. REv. 534
(1971).
54. 2 Cal. 3d at 267-68, 466 P.2d 231, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 7. The only case cited which
did not involve an actual physical intrusion was Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616
(1886). In Boyd, the Supreme Court held that a statute authorizing courts in tax cases
to compel a taxpayer to produce his records or concede charges against him violated
the fourth and fifth amendments. Justice Bradley found that the statute unduly
intruded into "the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life." Id. at 630. How-
ever, since failure to comply with the financial disclosure provisions of the Bank Secrecy
Act does not compel a concession of charges, Boyd is distinguishable from cases arising
under the Act.
55. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
56. Id. at 353.
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It is conceivable that the Supreme Court's extension of the search con-
cept to include surveillance activities not involving a physical intrusion
provides the basis for a finding that the reporting requirements of the
Bank Secrecy Act constitute a search. Unlike Carmel-By-The-Sea, this
was the approach utilized in Stark, where the court, relying upon the
language in Katz, characterized the reporting requirements as a surveil-
lance device designed to facilitate government investigations.5 7
The Stark court found further authority in another case involving
electronic surveillance. In United States v. United States District Court,58
the Supreme Court considered the presidential claim of a legal right to
monitor telephone conversations with wire taps whenever the President
deemed it necessary to protect the nation from domestic subversion. The
Court, recognizing the potential danger which unreasonable surveillance
could pose to individual privacy, held that the fourth amendment shield-
ed such conversations from surveillance. The court in Stark, relying on
Katz and United States District Court, attempted to avoid the mistake in
Carmel of -extending the fourth amendment to disclosure cases without
demonstrating how such extension is justified. In Stark, however, the
court failed to recognize that the language in both Katz and United
States District Court is concerned only with intrusions upon the exercise
of free speech. In United States District Court, the Supreme Court cited
Katz for the narrow proposition that "[though physical entry of the
home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amend-
ment is directed, its broader spirit now shields private speech from un-
reasonable surveillance." 11 Such a narrow interpretation of Katz-as
applying only to privacy of speech-lends little support to the protection
of financial privacy through the fourth amendment."0
In addition to the possible lack of support emanating from Katz, it is
suggested that reliance upon the fourth amendment alone may be in-
appropriate for another reason. It is well settled that Congress has the
power to require records and reports from business entities and citizens.61
57. 347 F. Supp. at 1248.
58. 92 S. Ct. 2125 (1972).
59. Id. at 2134 (emphasis supplied).
60. But cf. Doe v. Bolton, 41 U.S.L.W. 4233, 4242 n.2 (U.S. Jan. 23, 1973) (Douglas, J.,
concurring). Justice Douglas concludes from Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Brimson,
154 U.S. 447, 478 (1894), that the Constitution does not permit a "general power of mak-
ing inquiry into the private affairs of the citizen." His reference to this case and others
setting forth similar ideas may indicate that Justice Douglas would accept an ex-
panded view of the fourth amendment.
61. See, e.g., United States v. Morton Salt, 338 U.S. 632 (1950); Shapiro v. United
States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); Wilson v. United
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In addition, it has been asserted that records required to be kept by law
are subject to inspection under the conditions established by statute.62
Furthermore, these records have been characterized as having such pub-
lic attributes that their inspection is not a search within the purview of
the fourth amendment. 63 Since the Supreme Court has stated that regu-
lations permiting records to be retained, rather than filed, are largely
for the convenience of the persons regulated, 64 the reasoning that inspec-
tion of required records is not a search also could apply to reports which
are required to be submitted.
In U.S. v. Morton Salt Co.,65 the Supreme Court noted, however, that
the fourth amendment places limits upon the government's exercise of
its investigatory powers. The Court stated the government's inquiry is
justified only when it is "within the authority of the agency, the demand
is not too indefinite and the information sought is reasonably relevant." 66
Thus, in conclusion, it must be conceded that if the requirements of the
Bank Secrecy Act are found to exceed the criteria articulated in Morton
Salt, they may violate the fourth amendment.
States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911); Cooper's Express, Inc. v. ICC, 330 F.2d 338 (1st Cir. 1964);
Stark v. Connally, 347 F. Supp. 1242 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
62. R. DAvIs, FEDERAL SEARCHES AND SEIZURES § 9.21, at 361-62 (1964); see Davis v.
United States, 328 U.S. 582 (1945).
63. R. DAvIs, FEDERAL SEARCHES AwD SEIZURES §§ 9.1, 9.21 (1964); see Shapiro v. United
States, 335 U.S. 1, 32-34 (1948); Bowles v. Glick Bros. Lumber Co., 146 F.2d 566 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 877 (1945); Fraenkel, Recent Developments in the Federal
Law of Searches and Seizures, 33 IowA L. REv. 472, 494 (1948).
64. Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 56 n.14 (1968).
65. 338 U.S. 632 (1950). This case involved an order of the Federal Trade Commission
requiring a corporation to file reports demonstrating that it had complied with the Com-
mission's cease and desist order. The court found that the reporting requirements did
not violate the fourth amendment. It should be noted that the court found that corpo-
rations cannot claim equality with individuals in the enjoyment of a right of privacy.
Therefore, it seems that reports required to be submitted by individuals may violate
the zone of privacy protected by the fourth amendment in instances where a corporate
reporting scheme would be upheld.
66. 338 U.S. at 633. Other decisions of the Supreme Court also indicate that govern-
mental inquiries can be so broad as to violate the fourth amendment. In Oklahoma Press
Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946), a government administrator obtained
subpoenas which sought the production of some of the petitioner's records. The peti-
tioner claimed that enforcement of the subpoena would permit general fishing expedi-
tions into the petitioner's books and records and therefore violated the search and
seizure provisions of the fourth amendment. The Court decided that the case did not
present a question of actual search and seizure. However, the Court did find that the
fourth amendment would protect against undue breadth or indefiniteness of the sub-
poena. In addition, the court stated that the requested materials must be relevant to the
agency's inquiry. See Federal Trade Comm'n v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298
(1924). See generally K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW T~xr § 3.02 (1972).
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The Fifth Amendment's Zone of Privacy
In addition to the fourth amendment, the fifth amendment could have
considerable importance in establishing a zone of privacy with respect to
the financial affairs of individuals. Since the Act requires persons to keep
records or file reports, and inasmuch as these records may serve as the
basis for criminal prosecution, the fifth amendment's protection against
self-incrimination may be invoked. Although a complete discussion of
the fifth amendment is beyond the scope of this discussion, some general
observations as to its applicability can be made.
A distinction 'exists between the use of the fifth amendment by indi-
viduals, and financial institutions. The privilege against self-incrimination
has been viewed as essentially a personal right, and it has been held inap-
plicable to corporations which refuse to produce incriminating records.67
Therefore, financial institutions may not invoke the privilege with respect
to the records and reports which the Act requires them to keep or sub-
mit. Moreover, an individual must own and possess the records in order
to assert the privilege.68 Since the records required to be kept by finan-
cial institutions belong to and are possessed by such institutions, individu-
al customers of the institutions may not invoke the privilege as to these
records. However, since some of the records and reports required to be
submitted by financial institutions involve records of transactions of in-
dividuals which the institution would not normally maintain for bank-
ing (as opposed to governmental) purposes, individuals may be able to
demonstrate that the collection and use of these records invades a zone
of privacy protected by the privilege against self-incrimination. Although
the Supreme Court has not yet delineated the scop-e of the fifth amend-
ment's zone of privacy, the Court has stated that such a zone exists. 9 Rec-
ords which financial institutions are required to keep for the exclusive
purpose of enabling the government to have readily accessible informa-
67. E.g., United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 7 n.9 (1970); Campbell Painting Corp.
v. Reid, 392 U.S. 286, 288-89 (1968); Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327
U.S. 186, 205-08 (1946); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699 (1944); United States
v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707, 726-27 (1944); Essgee Co. of China v.
United States, 262 U.S. 151, 155-56 (1923); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 382-83
(1911). The leading case is Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
68. Note, Books and Records and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 33 BRoox-
LYN L. REv. 70, 71 (1966); see, e.g., Remmer v. United States, 205 F.2d 277 (9th Cit.
1953), rev'd on other grounds, 347 U.S. 227 (1954); Davis v. SEC, 109 F.2d 6 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 309 U.S. 687 (1940).
69. E.g., Roe v. Wade, 41 U.S.L.W. 4213, 4225 (U.S. Jan. 23, 1973); Griswold -v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
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don concerning the financial transactions of a major segment of society
should not be characterized as business records. These records are main-
tained for the governmental purpose of securing prosecutions of indi-
viduals and arguably invade the zone of privacy protected by the fifth
amendment.
The application of the privilege against self-incrimination with respect
to records and reports required of the individual himself is viewed dif-
ferently than reporting requirements concerning corporate records. For
nearly a century, the privilege has prohibited the compulsory production
of one's private incriminating papers.7° However, the.privilege regarding
private records has been limited by the development of the "required
records" doctrine.
This doctrine was first espoused in dictum in Wilson v. United States,71
where the Court stated that records required to be kept by law and which
are used to provide information on subjects of governmental regulation
do not afford the custodian the privilege against self-incrimination.7 2 The
language of Wilson was employed by lower federal courts to deny the
privilege.73 However, the doctrine was not fully developed until the de-
cision in Shapiro v. United States.74 There, the Court held that records
required to be kept under the regulatory power of Congress had ac-
quired "public aspects" and thus were not subject to the privilege.75 The
elements of the doctrine as articulated in Shapiro were clarified by the
Supreme Court in Grosso v. United States.76 The Court noted:
70. See, e.g., United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707, 726 (1944);
Wilson v. United States, 221 US. 361, 377 (1911); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,
631-35 (1886).
71. 221 U.S. 361 (1911). For a discussion of the doctrine, see Edgar, Tax
Records, The Fifth Amendment and the "Required Records Doctrine," 9 ST. Louis
LJ. 502, 503-04 (1965); Note, Constitutional Aspects of Federal Tax Investigations, 57
COLUM. L. Rlv. 676, 695-99 (1957).
72. 221 U.S. at 380 (1911).
73. Rogers v. United States, 138 F.2d 992, 996 (6th Cir. 1943); United States v. Sherry,
294 F. 684 (N.D. M11. 923); United States v. Jones, 72 F. Supp. 48 (S.D. Miss. 1947). The
Wilson dictum was also noted in Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582 (1946). However,
Davis is distinguishable from the other required records cases because the papers in-
volved were the property of the government and not of the individual.
74. 335 U.S. 1 (1948).
75. Id. "The Court apparently reasoned that title to records having 'public aspects' is
partially vested in the government; the individual thus is merely a 'custodian' and his
property interest in the records is insufficient to support a claim of the privilege against
self-incrimination:' Note, Required Information and the Privilege Against Self-Incrim-
hation, 65 CoLvM. L. Rv. 681, 685 (1965).
76. 390 U.S. 62 (1968).
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The premises of the doctrine, as it is described in Shapiro, are evi-
dently three: first, the purpose of the United States' inquiry must
be essentially regulatory; second, information is to be obtained by
requiring the preservation of records of a kind which the regu-
lated party has customarily kept; and third, the records themselves
must have assumed "public aspects" which render them at least
analogous to public documents v7
Thus, if any of the three criteria enunciated in Grosso are absent, the
doctrine could not be applied, and the privilege against self-incrimination
would be available. An individual who is required to keep records or
submit reports under the Bank Secrecy Act may be able to attack all
three of these criteria. First, since the requirements of the Act are not
only for regulatory, but also for criminal purposes, it is questionable
whether the government's inquiry is "essentially regulatory." Second,
the reports presently required of individuals, particularly those relating
to foreign transactions, may not be the kind of record the regulated
party has customarily kept.'8 It is possible that, but for the Act, the indi-
vidual would not have kept records of his foreign transactions. Finally,
the requirement that the records assume "public aspects" must be con-
sidered. In most instances, courts have held that records required to be
kept pursuant to a reasonable regulatory scheme have "public aspects." 79
However, it is submitted that this interpretation of public aspects should
be construed narrowly where the records of individuals are kept for both
regulatory and criminal purposes. In Marchetti v. United States8 0 the
Supreme Court stated:
The Government's anxiety to obtain information known to a priv-
ate individual does not without more render that information pub-
lic; if it did, no room would remain for the application of the
constitutional privilege. Nor does it stamp information with a
public character that the Government has formalized its demands
in the attire of a statute; if this alone were sufficient, the constitu-
tional privilege could be entirely abrogated by any Act of Con-
gress.8 '
77. Id. at 67-68.
78. Cf. Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 57 (1968).
79. E.g., Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948).
80. 390 U.S. 39 (1968).
81. Id. at 57.
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Thus, the Court recognized that a government record keeping re-
quirement does not of itself cause such documents to have "public as-
pects." Furthermore, commentators have stressed the absurdity of the
proposition that all records required by the government acquire "public
aspects." 82 If this proposition were accepted, any papers considered
private would become public by legislation requiring that they be main-
tained.
The "required records" doctrine has been held to be applicable to re-
ports as well as records.8 3 Therefore, the doctrine is an important con-
sideration to both the reporting and the recording provisions of the Bank
Secrecy Act. Thus, if an individual can demonstrate that the records
or reports required by the Act do not meet the criteria necessary to
activate the doctrine, the privilege against self-incrimination could be
utilized.
"Fundamental Rights" under the Ninth Amendment
If the courts are unwilling to find a right of financial privacy based
on the fourth or fifth amendments, another possible source of such right
is the ninth amendment. It has been suggested that the language of this
amendment indicates that the framers of the Constitution recognized the
existence of "fundamental rights" other than those specifically mentioned
in the first eight amendments.84 Therefore, if the right of privacy as to
financial affairs can be proven to be a "fundamental right," it should be
protected.
Although it is difficult to define the term "fundamental right," the
Supreme Court has established guidelines to be used in the determination
of whether a particular right is fundamental. In Snyder v. Massachu-
setts, 5 the Court stated that the "traditions and [collective] conscience
of our people" must be considered in order to determine if the right is
"so rooted [there] . . . as to be ranked as fundamental." 86 In addition,
the Court asserted in Powell v. Alabama"' that the inquiry is whether the
right involved "is of such a character that it cannot be denied without
82. See Note, Books and Records and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 33
BROOKLYN L. REv. 70, 95-101 (1966); Note, Constitutional Limits on the Admissibility
in the Federal Courts of Evidence Obtained from Required Records, 68 HAaw. L. REV.
340, 341-43 (1954).
83. Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 56 n.14 (1968).
84. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 488 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
85. 291 U.S. 97 (1934).
86. Id. at 105.
87. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
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violating those 'fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at
the base of all our civil and political institutions' .. ," 88
In the past, fundamental rights language normally was used only in
discussions aimed at bringing certain rights within the purview of the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.8 Thus, such language
usually has been employed only when actions of the state, as contrasted
with the federal government, were questioned. However, in the recent
Supreme Court decision in Roe v. Wade ° Mr. Justice Blackmun, after
reviewing the Court's past decisions, including cases concerning action
by the federal government, stated: "These decisions make it clear that
only personal rights that can be deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty' .. . are included in this guarantee of personal
privacy." 91 Although Wade involved the invalidation of state action,
the use of cases involving federal action arguably implies that the Court
will in all cases look to see if the right is "fundamental." 92
88. Id. at 67.
89. A complete discussion of the disagreement as to the applicability of the provisions
of the Bill of Rights to the states through the fourteenth amendment is beyond the
scope of this Comment. In essence, some Justices, including Cardozo, felt the due
process clause absorbed the Bill of Rights only to the extent that provisions were "im-
plicit in the concept of ordered liberty." See, e.g., Palko v. Connecticut, 302 US. 319,
325 (1937). Justice Black expressed the opinion that the fourteenth amendment made
the specifics of the Bill of Rights applicable to the states; however, Justice Black would
not apply the amendment to protect other rights that were not fundamental. Adamson
v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). Other members of the
Court agreed with Justice Black that the Bill of Rights applied to the states via the
fourteenth amendment, but also believed that other rights were protected by the amend-
ment. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 123-25 (1947) (Murphy and Rutledge, J.J.,
dissenting); see, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Griffin v. California,
380 U.S. 609 (1965); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Wolf v. Colorado,
338 U.S. 25 (1949); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Gitlow v. People of
New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934). See gen-
erally Lacy, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Evolution of the
Absorption Doctrine, 23 WASH. & LEE L. Rzv. 37 (1966); Redlich, Are There "Certain
Rights .. . Retained by the People"?', 37 N.Y.U.L. Rrv. 787 (1962); Morrison, Does the
Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN. L. Rxv. 140 (1949). Most
of the provisions of the Bill of Rights now have been incorporated into the fourteenth
amendment. Redlich, supra at 795.
90. 41 U.S.L.W. 4213 (U.S. Jan. 23, 1973).
91. Id. at 4225.
92. The Court has used the concept of fundamental rights in cases involving federal
action. As early as 1894, the Court stated: "It was said in argument that the twelfth
section [of the Interstate Commerce Act] was in derogation of those fundamental guar-
antees of personal rights that are recognized by the Constitution as inhering in the free-
dom of the citizen. It is scarcely necessary to say that the power given to Congress to
regulate interstate commerce does not carry with it any power to destroy or impair
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Although the protection of some "fundamental" rights from federal
action previously has been based on the fifth amendment's due process
clause,93 the ninth amendment seems to provide a firmer foundation for
the protection of an individual's "fundamental rights." This view is sup-
ported by the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Goldberg in Griswold
v. Connecticut. 4 After discussing the historical aspects of the amend-
ment, he stated: "[T]he Ninth Amendment, in indicating that not all
... liberties are specifically mentioned in the first eight amendments, is
surely relevant in showing the existence of other fundamental personal
rights, now protected from state, as well as federal, infringement." 91
Further support for this employment of the ninth amendment can be
found in a statement by Professor Ringold that "the ninth amendment
must . . . be considered as authority to support the existence of newly
discovered fundamental rights." 96 Thus, if the right of financial privacy
can be established as a fundamental right, the provisions of the ninth
amendment should be applicable.
The "Penumbra Approach"
A final source of the right to privacy in financial affairs may be found
in the "penumbra language" in Griswold. Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking
for the Court, noted that although certain rights, such as the right of as-
sociation, are not mentioned specifically in either the Constitution or the
Bill of Rights, these rights have been protected as existing within the
various provisions of the Bill of Rights. He concluded that the "specific
guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations
from those guarantees that help give them life and substance.... Various
those guarantees." Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 479 (1894)
(emphasis supplied). See Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Kent v.
Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
93. See, e.g., Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Kent v. Dulles, 357
U.S. 116 (1958); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). The difficulty with the use of
the fifth amendment is its narrow scope in substantive areas. Redlich, supra note 89,
at 800.
94. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). For an excellent collection of articles concerning Griswold,
see Symposium on the Griswold Case and the Right of Privacy, 64 MicH. L. REv. 197
(1965); Beaney, The Griswold Case and the Expanding Right to Privacy, 1966 Wis. L.
REv. 979.
95. 381 U.S. at 493 (emphasis supplied).
96. Ringold, The History of the Enactment of the Ninth Amendment and Its Recent
Development, 8 TULSA L.J. 1, 24 (1972). See generally Beaney, supra note 94; Redlich,
supra note 89, at 802-10.
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guarantees create zones of privacy." 9 These "zones of privacy" were
characterized as existing in the first,98 third,9 9 fourth, 00 fifth, 101 and ninth
amendments.1 2 The Court in Griswold, however, did not rest its hold-
ing upon the "penumbra" of any specific provision of the Bill of Rights;
rather, it found the relationship 'existing in that case'03 to be within a
zone of privacy created by a combination of fundamental Constitutional
guarantees.
The Court's reference to a "zone of privacy created by several ...
constitutional guarantees" 104 has been construed to mean that the Con-
stitution provides "a wider, more general guarantee of privacy, within
which specific claims may appropriately claim and deserve recogni-
tion." 15 This expansive interpretation of the decision supports the possi-
bility of finding a right of financial privacy to exist in the "penumbra"
of the Bill of Rights. Further support can be found in the statement of
97. 381 U.S. at 484.
98. The right of association was utilized by the Court to demonstrate that there is a
zone of privacy within the penumbra of the first amendment. 381 U.S. at 484. See
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); cf. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963);
Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
99. The Court recognized prohibition against the quartering of soldiers in an indi-
vidual's house in time of peace without the owner's consent as an aspect of the right
of privacy. 381 U.S. at 484.
100. The condemnation of unreasonable searches and seizures frequently has been
described as creating a right of privacy. See, e.g., United States v. United States Dist.
Court, 92 S. Ct. 2125 (1972); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
101. The Griswold Court described the self-incrimination clause as creating a zone
of privacy which the government cannot force the citizen to surrender. 381 U.S. at 484.
102. Although Justice Douglas referred to the ninth amendment, he did not elaborate
on the zone of privacy which it protects. As previously discussed, Justice Goldberg's
concurring opinion was based on this amendment, which provides: "The enumeration
in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others
retained by the people." After discussing some historical aspects of the amendment,
Justice Goldberg stated that the relation of the family is a fundamental right which is
protected by the ninth amendment. 381 U.S. at 495-96. Justice Harlan, concurring, de-
clared that the proper inquiry was whether the statute infringed upon the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment by violating basic values "implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty." It was his belief that the decision should not rest upon the Bill of
Rights. 381 U.S. at 500. It should be noted that Justice Goldberg also considered the
fourteenth amendment important to his decision. See 381 U.S. at 487-88. The importance
of the fourteenth amendment in the area of privacy was recognized in the recent de-
cision of Roe v. Wade, 41 U.SL.W. 4213, 4225 (U.S. Jan. 23, 1973).
103. It was held that a state criminal statute prohibiting the use of contraceptive de-
vices invaded the right of marital privacy.
104. 381 U.S. at 485.
105. Beaney, supra note 94, at 982.
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Mr. Justice Douglas in Griswold that a "governmental purpose to control
or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulation may not
be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby
invade the area of protected freedoms." 106
The use of the penumbra approach as to the right of financial privacy
would allow a combination of the arguments which were advanced in
the discussions of other possible sources of financial privacy; whatever
protections exist in the fourth, fifth and ninth amendments could be
utilized. If the courts are unwilling to imply a right of financial privacy
from a particular provision of the Constitution, yet are of the opinion
that a right of financial privacy exists within the broad scope of the Bill
of Rights, the use of the penumbra approach would be justified.
APPLICATION OF A FINANCIAL RIGHT OF
PRIVACY TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE BANK SECRECY ACT
Should the courts determine that financial affairs are guaranteed a
legal right of privacy,107 it would then b-e necessary to determine the ex-
tent of the right. Legal commentators and the Supreme Court have
recognized the need to balance competing interests in privacy cases.108
Therefore, the parameters of the right can best be determined by utiliz-
ing a balancing process. It is submitted that the approach suggested by
Mr. Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion in Katz is the proper
method of establishing the limits of the right. Under this approach, the
initial inquiry is whether an individual has exhibited an actual (sub-
jective) 'expectation of privacy and whether such expectation is one that
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable." 9 It is then necessary to
balance the interests of the government against those of the individual.
The process of balancing conflicting interests with respect to rights of
privacy based upon the fourth amendment was described in United
States v. United States District Court, where the Court stated: "As the
106. 381 U.S. at 485, quoting from NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964).
107. See LeValley & Lancy, supra note 37, at 979-80; cf. Emerson, Nine Justices in
Search of a Doctrine, 64 MicH. L. REv. 219, 233 (1965). But see Gross, supra note 46,
at 35, 40-46, 53.
108. See generally Lusky, supra note 46, at 701-10; The Conputerization of Govern-
mnent Files: What Impact on the Individual, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1377, 1428-32 (1968).
The Supreme Court has held that where fundamental rights are involved, regulations
limiting those rights may be justified only by a "compelling state interest." Roe v. Wade,
41 U.S.L.W. 4213, 4226 (U.S. Jan. 23, 1973).
109. 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967). Although this approach was advanced in a fourth
amendment case, it should be applicable to other situations.
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Fourth Amendment is not absolute in its terms, our task is to examine
and balance the basic values at stake in this case: the duty of the Govern-
ment to protect the domestic security, and the potential danger posed
by unreasonable surveillance to individual privacy . ," 110 Although
this language was advanced in a case arising under the provisions of the
fourth amendment, it indicates the type of inquiry necessary in order
to determine the extent of the right to financial privacy, regardless of its
ultimate constitutional source. The use of this balancing process makes
possible the examination of the application of a right of financial privacy
to the specific provisions of the Bank Secrecy Act.
Recording Requirements of the Act
Even if courts should recognize that individuals have a legal right to
privacy in financial affairs, the invalidation of the Act's record-keeping
provisions11' would still be difficult under the balancing process. The
government's power to require records is settled." 2 Although the Su-
preme Court has asserted that there are limits upon the records that can
be required," 3 such limits have yet to be defined. It is submitted that the
nature of the records required by the Bank Secrecy Act do not exceed
permissible limits. Most of the required records are of the sort normally
maintained by banks and financial institutions; thus, it may be argued
that an individual cannot have an expectation of privacy as to the keep-
ing of such records. Furthermore, adequate procedural safeguards are
present, since the government can compel the production of these rec-
ords only by subpoena." 4
A bank customer, however, may be able to challenge a subpoena for
financial records on a fifth amendment basis" 5 where those records are
maintained for a governmental purpose as opposed to a commercial bank-
ing purpose."6 Furthermore, an individual may be able to challenge the
110. 92 S. Ct. 2125, 2135 (1972).
111. See notes 4-19 supra & accompanying text.
112. See, e.g., United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950); Shapiro v. United
States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948); Stark v. Connally, 347 F. Supp. 1242, 1250 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
The only real requirement for such record-keeping is that it be the subject of a valid
regulatory interest. See Note, Books and Records and the Privilege Against Self-Incrim-
ination, 33 BRooKLY" L. REV. 70, 96 (1966).
113. Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 56 (1968); Shapiro v. United States, 335
U.S. 1, 32 (1948).
114. See 12 U.S.C. § 1959 (1970).
115. See notes 68-69 supra & accompanying text.
116. Since these records are beyond what is necessary for the financial institutions to
conduct their business, the customer should have standing to challenge a subpoena as
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compelled production of records he is required to maintain where the
subpoena is overly broad, 117 or where the records would be self-incrim-
inating, providing that the "required records" doctrine does not apply.
18
Stronger arguments can be made for the protection of individual financial
privacy when domestic and foreign financial transactions are subject to
those required reporting provisions which do not also include subpoena
or warrant safeguards.
Reporting Foreign Financial Transactions
In Stark, the court asserted that adequate procedural safeguards ex-
isted with respect to the foreign reporting requirements of the Act, and
thus the constitutional challenge as to these provisions failed. 119 The pro-
cedural safeguard to which the court alluded was the requirement that
the Secretary apply for a search warrant if he believed that monetary
instruments were being transmitted without the filing of a report.
20
Although this provision does protect against arbitrary searches by the
government, individuals and financial institutions still must report cer-
tain foreign transactions to the government even in the absence of a
subpoena.' 2 ' Moreover, the requirement of reporting without subpoena
was the major impetus for the holding in Stark that the domestic report-
ing requirements invaded the individual's right of privacy and, there-
fore, were unconstitutional.
The court attempted to distinguish its holdings as to the constitution-
ality of the foreign and domestic reporting schemes by discussing the
broad power of the executive in the area of foreign affairs. United States
v. United States District Court12 was cited as authority for the proposi-
tion that the Supreme Court has ascertained that a distinction exists
between domestic surveillance and "surveillance where foreign nations
are involved." 128 In United States District Court, the Court implied that
to those records. See Stark v. Connally, 347 F. Supp. 1242 (N.D. Cal. 1972). In the past,
customers have had no standing to question subpoenas of. records. See, e.g., Harris v.
United States, 413 F.2d 316 (9th Cit. 1969); Galbraith v. United States, 387 F.2d 617 (10th
Cit. 1968).
117. See notes 65-66 supra & accompanying text.
118. See notes 70-82 supra & accompanying text.
119. 347 F. Supp. at 1245.
120. This requirement is contained in 31 U.S.C. § 1105 (1970).
121. See notes 17-24 supra & accompanying text.
122. 92 S. Ct. 2125 (1972). For a discussion of the facts of the case see note 58 supra
& accompanying text.
123. Stark v. Connally, 347 F. Supp. 1242, 1245 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
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actions which are not permissible in domestic cases may survive in areas
where interactions with foreign nations exist.'2 4 However, it is submitted
that although a difference exists between the necessity for electronic
surveillance of domestic subversive activities and those that may involve
foreign espionage, such a distinction is not nearly as imperative with
respect to reports concerning financial transactions. Both the foreign
and domestic reporting requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act were
enacted for criminal and regulatory purposes;'125 neither is designed to
combat subversive activities of foreign powers.
One possible distinction as to the constitutionality of the domestic and
foreign reporting provisions is that the government's need for informa-
tion concerning foreign transactions is more vital. This obtains because
the government does not have the ability to subpoena records of foreign
financial institutions. However, this reasoning should apply only to the
keeping of records of foreign financial transactions. It has no application
to the reporting of such transactions without a proper subpoena or war-
rant. The maintenance of the records provides the government with po-
tential access to the needed information without infringing upon the
rights of privacy to the extent of requiring routine reporting of these
transactions.
The only plausible distinction between the reporting of foreign and
dom'estic transactions is that the domestic requirements are broader in
scope and therefore may pose a more substantial fourth amendment
problem. However, because both of these reporting requirements are
broad, this distinction should b'e rejected. It is suggested that the report-
ing provisions relating to foreign transactions deserve more scrutiny than
they were accorded in Stark, and that the ultimate determination of
whether they infringe upon privacy should be identical to the determina-
tion of whether the domestic reporting scheme invades individual priva-
cy. Therefore, the discussion of the constitutionality of the domestic
reporting requirements should be applicable as well to the determination
of the constitutionality of the reporting provisions relating to foreign
transactions.
Reporting Domestic Transactions
If a constitutional right of privacy in the area of financial affairs exists,
the broad requirements of the domestic reporting section of the Act may
124. 92 S. Ct. at 2139.
125. See notes 1-2 supra & accompanying text.
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be diflicult to sustain.126 The reporting requirements may be interpreted
to be so broad as to violate the fourth amendment. 2 7 In addition, the re-
quired reports may violate the zone of privacy protected by the fifth
amendment. 2 The objectionable nature of these reports becomes mani-
fest when the balancing process is employed. Since these reporting pro-
visions arguably violate several constitutional guarantees, the govern-
ment's need for reporting (as opposed to a record-keeping arrangement
which requires a subpoena) should be -established before the reporting
requirements can be found to be permissible. And, the government's need
for the reporting provisions is arguable at best. The questionable value
of the reporting system is best depicted by a statement of a Commissioner
of Internal Revenue: "[T]he creation of a mass of paper beyond
our capacity to digest.., could have the effect of submerging and mak-
ing unobtainable information of special interest to us." 129 Moreover, the
government in its brief in Stark conceded that a subpoena should be re-
quired in order to obtain information concerning an individual's domestic
financial transactions.30 If the invasion of privacy resulting from forced
disclosure of such transactions is balanced against the inconvenience of
requiring the government to obtain a subpoena, it is submitted that the
right of the individual must prevail.
CONCLUSION
The legal right of privacy is a viable and expanding concept. The ap-
plicability of the ninth amendment as a source of further expansion of
this right gradually is being accepted. However, it is not clear whether
a personal right of privacy in the area of financial affairs will be recog-
nized in the near future.
The constitutionality of provisions of the Bank Secrecy Act relating
to the reporting of foreign and domestic transactions will be question-
able if such a right becomes established. However, recognition of a right
of financial privacy probably would not affect the record-keeping pro-
visions of the Act.
126. For a discussion of these requirements see notes 25-29 supra & accompanying text.
127. See notes 65-66 supra & accompanying text.
128. See notes 67-83 supra & accompanying text.
129. 347 F. Supp. at 1251.
130. Id.
